THE MARKETING CHANNEL AS AN EQUILIBRIUM SET OF CONTRACTSZUSMAN P; ETGAR M.1981; MANAGE. SCI.; ISSN 0025-1909; USA; DA. 1981; VOL. 27; NO 3; PP. 284-302; BIBL. 18 REF.Article

ECONOMIC MODELS OF DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONTRACT STRUCTUREFRONISTAS AC.1979; ICCS 79. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBERNETICS AND SOCIETY/1979/DENVER CO; USA; NEW YORK: IEEE; DA. 1979; PP. 566-572; BIBL. 20 REF.Conference Paper

OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATIONHARRIS M; RAVIV A.1979; J. ECON. THEORY; USA; DA. 1979; VOL. 20; NO 2; PP. 231-259; BIBL. 17 REF.Article

THE IMPLICIT CONTRACT THEORY OF UNEMPLOYMENT MEETS THE WAGE BILL ARGUMENTAKERLOF GA; MIYAZAKI H.1980; REV. ECON. STUDIES; GBR; DA. 1980; VOL. 47; NO 147; PP. 321-338; BIBL. 24 REF.Article

Une approche multi-agents par conventions et contrats pour la coordination de l'entreprise manufacturière réseau = A multi-agent approach based on conventions and contracts for network manufacturing enterprise coordinationCloutier, Louis; Espinasse, Bernard.1999, 190 p.Thesis