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THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND THE HEURISTIC OF ZERO SUM INTERPRETATION.BELL RI.1975; CYBERNETICA; BELG.; DA. 1975; VOL. 18; NO 4; PP. 299-303; BIBL. 9 REF.Article

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NONINTERACTION IN AN ANONYMOUS THREE-PERSON PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME. = ABSENCE D'INTERACTION DANS UN JEU DU DILEMME DU PRISONNIER A 3 PERSONNES ANONYMESKAHAN JP.1973; BEHAV. SCI.; U.S.A.; DA. 1973; VOL. 18; NO 2; PP. 124-127; BIBL. 8REF.Article

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The value of information in Newcomb's problem and the prisoner's dilemmaSNOW, P.Theory and decision. 1985, Vol 18, Num 2, pp 129-133, issn 0040-5833Article

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Sociale dilemma's, een overzicht = Une revue du dilemme social = Social dilemma, an overviewWILKE, H; LIEBRAND, W; MESSICK, D. M et al.Nederlands tijddschrift voor de psychologie en haar grensgebieden. 1983, Vol 38, Num 8, pp 463-480, issn 0028-2235Article

Evolution of iterated prisoner's dilemma game strategies in structured demes under random pairing in game playingISHIBUCHI, Hisao; NAMIKAWA, Naoki.IEEE transactions on evolutionary computation. 2005, Vol 9, Num 6, pp 552-561, issn 1089-778X, 10 p.Article

COMMUNICATION AND SEX EFFECTS IN A FIVE-PERSON PRISONER'S DILEMMAGAME.CALDWELL MD.1976; J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL.; U.S.A.; DA. 1976; VOL. 33; NO 3; PP. 273-280; BIBL. 1 P.Article

RETALIATION LEVEL AS A FOUNDATION FOR SUBSEQUENT CONCILIATION.LINDSKOLD S; BENNETT R; WAYNER M et al.1976; BEHAV. SCI.; U.S.A.; DA. 1976; VOL. 21; NO 1; PP. 13-18; BIBL. 9 REF.Article

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PROXEMIC EFFECTS ON COOPERATION, ATTITUDE, AND APPROACH-AVOIDANCE IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME = LES EFFETS DE LA DISTANCE INTERPERSONNELLE SUR LA COOPERATION, ATTITUDE ET APPROCHE EVITEMENT DANS LE JEU DU DILEMME DU PRISONNIERGARDIN H; KAPLAN KJ; FIRESTONE IJ et al.1973; J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL.; U.S.A.; DA. 1973; VOL. 27; NO 1; PP. 13-18; BIBL. 18REF.Article

THE EFFECTS OF PERSONALITY AND SITUATIONAL VARIABLES ON BEHAVIORAL TRUST = LES EFFETS DE LA PERSONNALITE ET DES VARIABLES LIEES A LA SITUATION SUR LA CONFIANCESCHLENKER BR; HELM B; TEDESCHI JT et al.1973; J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL.; U.S.A.; DA. 1973; VOL. 25; NO 3; PP. 419-427; BIBL. 21 REF.Article

SEQUENTIELLE DETERMINANTEN VON ENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME: EINE INFORMATIONSTHEORETISCHE ANALYSE = LES DETERMINANTS SEQUENTIELS DES DECISIONS DANS LE JEU DU DILEMME DU PRISONNIER: ANALYSE INFORMATIONNELLEMIKULA G; RAAB E.1972; PSYCHOL. BEITR.; DTSCH.; DA. 1972; VOL. 14; NO 3; PP. 450-469; ABS. ANGL. FR.; BIBL. 1P.Article

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN DYADS: EFFECTS OF DISSIMILAR GOAL ORIENTATIONS AND DIFFERING EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE PARTNERGARNER K; DEUTSCH M.1974; J. CONFLICT RESOLUT.; U.S.A.; DA. 1974; VOL. 18; NO 4; PP. 634-645; BIBL. 7REF.Article

EFFECTS OF SEX ROLE IN A MAXIMIZING DIFFERENCE GAME. A REPLICATION IN CANADACARMENT DW.1974; J. CONFLICT RESOLUT.; U.S.A.; DA. 1974; VOL. 18; NO 3; PP. 461-472; BIBL. 1P.Article

PERCEPTION OF PAYOFF STRUCTURE AND OPPONENT'S BEHAVIOR IN RELATED MATRIX GAMESSHUBIK M; WOLF G; POON B et al.1974; J. CONFLICT RESOLUT.; U.S.A.; DA. 1974; VOL. 18; NO 4; PP. 646-655Article

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HONESTY AND DECEIT AS INFLUENCE TACTICSMONTEVERDE FJ; PASCHKE R; TEDESCHI JT et al.1974; SOCIOMETRY; U.S.A.; DA. 1974; VOL. 37; NO 4; PP. 583-591; BIBL. 7REF.Article

!!WASH-IN, WASH-OUT'' AND SYSTEMIC EFFECTS IN EXTENDED PRISONER'S DILEMMATERHUNE KW.1974; J. CONFLICT RESOLUT.; U.S.A.; DA. 1974; VOL. 18; NO 4; PP. 656-685; BIBL. 18REF.Article

PREJUDICED LIBERALS. RACE AND INFORMATION EFFECTS IN A TWO-PERSON GAMEBAXTER GW JR.1973; J. CONFLICT RESOLUT.; U.S.A.; DA. 1973; VOL. 17; NO 1; PP. 131-161; BIBL. 1 P. 1/2Article

COMPLIANCE TO THREAT AS A FUNCTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOURCES' PRIOR LOSSESMICHELINI RL.1975; BULL. PSYCHON. SOC.; U.S.A.; DA. 1975; VOL. 5; NO 3; PP. 223-224; BIBL. 7REFArticle

RECIPROCITY, COHESIVENESS AND COOPERATION IN TWO-PERSON GAMES. = RECIPROCITE, COHESION ET COOPERATION DANS LES JEUX A 2BRAVER SL.1975; PSYCHOL. REP.; U.S.A.; DA. 1975; VOL. 36; NO 2; PP. 371-378; BIBL. 1 P. 1/2Article

WHEN MARTYRDOM PAYS. THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OPPONENTS' PAST GAME BEHAVIOR.BRAVER SL; VAN ROHRER.1975; J. CONFLICT RESOLUT.; U.S.A.; DA. 1975; VOL. 19; NO 4; PP. 652-662; BIBL. 19 REF.Article

INDIAN AND CANADIAN CHOICE BEHAVIOUR IN A MAXIMIZING DIFFERENCE GAME AND IN A GAME OF CHICKENCARMENT DW.1974; J. INTERNATION. PSYCHOL.; FR.; DA. 1974; VOL. 9; NO 3; PP. 213-221; ABS. FR.; BIBL. 10REF.Article